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Abstract: 
In the past, governments had more freedom in setting their taxes as the 
barriers to free movement of capital and people were high. The gradual process 
of globalization is lowering these barriers and results in rising capital flows and 
greater manpower mobility. Tax competition exists when governments are 
encouraged to lower fiscal burdens to either encourage the inflow of productive 
resources or discourage the exodus of those resources. With tax competition in 
the era of globalization politicians have to keep tax rates “reasonable” to 
dissuade workers and investors from moving to a lower tax environment. Most 
countries started to reform their tax policies to improve their competitiveness. 
However, the tax burden is just one part of a complex formula describing national 
competitiveness. The other criteria like total manpower cost, labor market 
flexibility, education levels, political stability, legal system stability and efficiency 
are also important. 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of “tax competition” was introduced by Charles Tiebout 
(1956) and started from the idea of the existence, for public assets, of the 
equivalent for the markets of public assets. As a consequence, the taxpayers 
should opt for those residences which offer them the combination of public 
assets and tax rates (meaning the prices of public assets), which would satisfy 
most of all their preferences. In their turn, the tax authorities shall try to attract 
the taxpayers within their own jurisdictions, giving them the combination tax 
rates – public assets, as they wish, until reaching an optimum dimension of the 
base assessment, meaning that which allows the minimization of the cost for the 
provided public assets. 
The analogy with the competition between the private economic agents 
can be looked at in the shape of two hypotheses. On one hand, it can be 
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translated as a “race” towards the cost reduction, which is equivalent to the rise 
of the efficiency with which the public funds are spent, and on the other hand, it 
can be noticed an effect of “limiting the waste”, by offering an attractive 
combination of prompt and reliable delivery of the public assets, for a price 
which would not exceed the level necessary for covering the costs and 
obtaining a reasonable profit. 
Tax competition displays especially regarding the attraction of: 
- direct foreign investments, considered as being more and more 
important for generating workplaces in the countries of the European 
Union; 
- mobile financial capital (portfolio investments), useful for financing the 
investments, for strengthening the financial markets and obtaining 
comparative advantages in delivering financial services; 
- financial flows inside-company, which can be channeled towards the own 
tax jurisdict ion by attracting those corporate functions used for the 
international transfer of the profits; 
- workforce with high professional skills. 
Tax competition presents both advantages and disadvantages. Low tax 
rates may stimulate economy and, under the proper conditions, may increase the 
finances at the budget. But if they are too low, these may be harmful for the 
finances at the budget and may endanger the public assets, such as infrastructure, 
education and health. 
 
Positive effects of tax competition 
 
One says that tax competition is capable of generating important positive 
effects.  
I. It is about, first of all, the reduction of the vulnerability of the taxpayers 
in regard to the exploitation carried out upon them by the state.  
However, it must be taken into account the existence of some inherent 
limitations in displaying this protection effect .  Therefore, the 
taxpayers can not avoid the necessi ty of l iving or having the 
residence in a state,  so they remain “exploitable” (unlike the users of a 
private market, who can decline to purchase the too onerous asset or service).  
Then, the activity of tax authorities allows the coercion, while the owners of 
resources less mobile can not carry out  th is  kind of censorship upon 
authorities. 
Finally, the authorities can form (by coordination or tax harmonization) r e a l  
“cartels”. Tax cartels are more harmful than the commercial ones, as commercial 
decisions are made every day, while reorientations of tax policy are made a lot 
rarely. 
The problem with this argumentation line is that it presumes that the 
authorities' decisions are intrinsically unfavorable to citizens, which can only take 
place if politicians attend narrow groups of interest and/or bureaucrats aim for 
own objectives, of maximizing the profit or the prerogatives. Or, is the things 
are really like that, then the preferable  manner  to  correc t  these 
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distortions is the direct action upon them, not by indirect mechanisms, such as 
tax competition, which may generate own distortions.  
II. Tax competitions may stimulate the rise of budgetary efficiency, as it 
determines the presentation of the best services at the lowest cost for the 
taxpayer.  
  As tax competition reduces the resources of the budget, the expenses must be well 
«managed», thus limiting the waste. But this thesis is valid only if the 
government acts as a benevolent maximizing item of the citizens' welfare, 
hypothesis which is though in contradiction with that which funds the first argument. 
III. In the third place, tax competition can stimulate economic activity, by 
releasing the investments of one part from the burden of the taxing, which damps them 
in many ways: by discouraging the saving and, therefore, reducing the 
“pool” of available investment capital (Teather, 2005); by reducing the available 
profit for reinvestment; and, by the fact that, if the revenue from investments of 
the shareholders is strongly taxable, then the companies would have to pay 
higher equities in order to attract capital. 
A study presented under the aegis of OCDE has estimated that 
economies grow one-half of 1 percent (0.5 percent) faster for every 10-
percentage point reduction in marginal tax rates (Mitchell, 2004). But this effect is 
not equally produced. If the reduction of very high tax rates stimulates the rise, one 
can not say the same thing about the tendency to zero of some very low tax rates.   
IV. Finally, tax competition allows the obtaining of some information 
which would “discover” the desirable features of a tax system. 
 
Negative effects of tax competition 
 
Tax competition is not always a game with a positive value, the circumstances in 
which its consequences are negative are neither a few, nor rarely encountered. 
Concisely presented, they refer to: 
A. Producing a suboptimal level of public assets: as the tax competition 
intensifies, it is more and more difficult for the taxpayers to be taxed at levels 
which would cover the marginal cost of delivering the public assets.  
It is true that this hypothesis seems to be infirmed by a study of Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000), according to which there aren't any indications that the countries 
which mobilize lower budgetary revenues in proportion to the GDP, 
“produce less desirable social economic indicators” than the countries with 
higher budgets in proportion to the GDP: much of what governments want to 
achieve through public spending could be achieved by levels of spending ranging 
from, say, 25 per cent and 35 per cent of GDP (Micossi,  Parascandolo & Triberti, 
2003). 
More than that, the statistic data do not support the thesis of a 
reduction, at the level of the European Union, o f  budgetary cashing,  
capable of  limiting the delivery capacity of public assets, not even regarding 
the taxes which are the most influenced by tax competition, those upon the 
revenues of corporations (profit or corporate tax). Finally, it is not obvious that a possible 
reduction of budgetary revenues should be automatically translated as  a  
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under  de l ive r  o f  publ i c  a sse t s .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  ex p e c t ed  t h a t ,  i n  
su c h  a  situation, the governments would react compressing the budgetary 
transfers. 
B. General erosion of budgetary revenues, with the consequence, among 
other things, of frustrating the reduction efforts of budgetary deficiencies, a 
problem which is particularly delicate in the European Union, in the context of 
the limits imposed by the Pact of Stability and Rise. 
This effect is presumed to rise from many causes: 
- reducing the cashing from the taxes upon the tax mobile bases, as a 
consequence of reducing the tax rates; 
- the flow of mobile factors of production from the countries with high rates 
towards those having lower taxes, with the consequence of reducing the 
t ax  bases  in  the  count r ies  which  prac t ice  h igher  t ax  ra t es ; 
- the reallocation of mobile factors of production can also lower factor 
payments to immobile factors, thus further eroding the tax base (Rabitsch, 
2007). 
As it is shown below, this phenomenon hasn't been encountered in practice 
so far, but for some small countries which engaged themselves in an aggressive tax 
competition, with the purpose of attracting investments of important 
dimensions in proportion to their economic dimension.  
More than that, although it could be checked in practice, the reduction 
of budgetary revenues would be a negative effect of tax competition only if the 
dimension of public budgets would be the optimal one, previous to their 
reduction.  
According to a study, if governments were otherwise perfectly efficient, 
tax competition would reduce levels of capital taxation by 3 per cent. To put this 
in perspective, levels of capital taxation in the EU are roughly 20 per cent of GDP 
(EU (European Commission), 2004b), so a reduction of 3 per cent of expected 
capital taxation receipts amounts to a reduction in government revenue of roughly 
0.5 per cent of GDP. In other words, even if governments are perfectly efficient, 
the damage caused by tax competition will amount to government spending being 
0.5 per cent of GDP below the optimum. Of course, this is on the assumption that 
governments are perfectly efficient, and so perfectly benevolent and 
knowledgeable; if government inefficiencies lead to taxes being more than 0.5 per 
cent of GDP above their optimum then tax competition is likely to be beneficial 
(Teather, 2005). 
 C. The movement of tax burden upon the less mobile tax bases, with 
negative effects on social plan. 
The loses of budgetary revenues associated to the reduction of tax burden 
upon the mobile factors of production could be, theoretically, compensated by 
increments of indirect taxes, but these – also a consequence of the harmonization 
measures taken for a few decades at the level of the European Council / European 
Union – are already at high levels. This situation leads to the re-setting of the 
structure of direct taxes, meaning that the less mobile tax bases come to be taxed 
more than the mobile ones. According to a Report of the Commission from 1996 
(“Monti Report”), within the European Union the tax rates of the capital and 
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independent activities (self-employed) decreased with a tenth between 1980-93, 
while the tax rates of the employees increased with a fifth (Bratton & 
McCahery, 2001). On the other hand, though, the budgetary cashing from the 
taxes on personal incomes in relation to GDP remained practically constant as a 
proportion of GDP of over 20 years: they represented 11 percent of GDP in 
1980 and 10,8 percent in 2002 (Boss, 2005). 
Unrighteous effects appear also due to their driving effect, in order to tax the 
personal incomes, the reductions of the tax rates upon the corporations' revenue. This 
takes place as, if the corporate tax is more reduced than the personal one, there is a 
tendency of the natural persons to organize the activity in the shape of a trading 
company, thus taking advantage of the lower tax rates. In order to avoid this pervert 
effect, many countries aim to align the marginal tax rate on personal income at the 
profit tax rate, with the consequence of reducing the progressiveness of personal 
income taxation and, implicitly, of the re-distributive capacity of the entire tax system 
(Rixen & Uhl, 2007). 
Also, the structure of the delivered public assets changes in the favor of those 
appreciated more by the most mobile taxpayers, social fractures may occur, as a 
consequence of the citizens' segregation or pervert situations such as “the 
exploitation” of the generous social services from a country, without contributing 
with taxes to their support (“the fiscal-social nomadism” of the taxpayers who change 
their residence according to the costs and benefits offered by each national system in 
different stages of life). 
Since the fear towards the outgoing capital attracted by more attractive 
destinations, fiscally speaking, seems to have been at the basis of the restraints of 
several European countries to reorient the taxes from the labor taxes towards those of 
capital income taxes, limiting the tax competition might have as a result a 
collateral result making this readjustment, with the consequence of stimulating the 
employment. This effect doesn't seem to be important, but: stimulating a rise with 
10 percentage points of the effective tax rate of the capital incomes in the 
European Union-15 and a reduction of the labor tax so that the public revenues 
could be maintained constant show that the reduction obtained like this of the 
unemployment rate is only of 0,6 percentage points (Sorensen, 2001). 
In this respect, there might be brought as counterargument the fact that the 
authorities should respond to the tax competition by reducing the taxes, not by 
transferring them to other tax bases (Teather, 2002).   
D. Influencing the decisions of placing the investments (distorting the 
allocation of resources: these are taken from the most efficient usages); 
A strong and suggestive analogy of this situation is offered by the theft of 
valuable jeweleries, with the purpose of their melting and using just the valuable 
metal which are made of. 
  This effect of the tax competition was sometimes argued, considering 
that  choosing the place for an investment depends mostly on other factors than 
the tax regimen (e.g., approaching the consumers, cheap labor force and with an 
adequate qualification, infrastructure, favorable regulations, and so on). 
Nevertheless, if there aren't important differences between the host-countries 
from the point of view of other elements, the tax regimen can have an important 
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role, a phenomenon stressed by several studies which identify a connection 
statistically significant between the tax level and foreign direct investments. 
Recent assessments (2000 and 2003) at the EU level reached to results 
remarkably close regarding the effect of the tax rates in the host-country 
determine a rise of the foreign direct investments in that country: a 1 percentage 
point decrease of the host-country tax rate determine a rise of the foreign direct 
investments in that country by 4.3 per cent (Cnossen, 2002) and, respectively, 
3.3 per cent. (Eggert, 2006). 
 But the tax system influences the investment decisions and indirectly, 
through the effects which other of its parameters have upon the business climate: 
the ambiguities of tax regulations, multiplicity of tax rates, frequent and 
unpredictable amendments of the rules, and so on. 
 Recent studies emphasized another important feature of the relationship 
between the tax regimen and foreign direct investments.      
 This way, it was shown that the host-country taxation play a limited role in 
investment decisions when investment is horizontal (i.e. targeting market access), 
as, in this case, the opportunity cost is given by the export one and there aren't 
locational alternatives. But when investment is “vertical”, representing a chain of 
an international productive network (global), there are several localization 
options, and the resulted end-product compete with the similar ones made by 
other producers. In this case, minimizing the production cost is more important so 
that the level of taxes from other possible different placings play a more important 
role (Lahreche-Revil, 2006).  
 Finally, another important feature of the relationship between the foreign 
direct investments and the variation of the tax rates is its nonlinearity. Concretely, the 
investments do not seem to respond significantly only to important reductions of the 
tax rates, which can have two explanations: even if the European Union is a well-
integrated economic space, there are still significant transaction costs associated to the 
cross-border capital flows (especially in the shape of direct investments), so that it is 
created a kind of an “arbitrage tunnel”, in the way that the companies redirect their 
activities only if the changes of tax rates are high enough to “come out” of this tunnel. 
Secondly, the small reductions of tax rates can be enough in order to compensate the 
“avoiding” of taxes carried out by methods already tested of tax planning in tax 
jurisdictions of which rules became well-known to the corporate taxpayers 
(Lahreche-Revil, 2006).  
 There are opinions according to which there is no valid reason in order to 
treat the tax regimen other than the other defining elements for the attraction of a 
certain placing potential for investments. Since the taxes represent the financing 
source of the public assets delivered to the citizens, assets which can be regarded 
as an indirect way of remuneration, an investment decision made according to 
them is equivalent to a decision made according to the labor force cost from one 
country to another (Teather, 2005). 
E. Inducing strategic interactions among the tax authorities of “prisoners’ 
dilemma” type, with the consequence of establishing to lower and lower levels 
of tax rates (race to the bottom). 
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The existence of this effect is empirically researched. A study refering to 
the situation from EU concludes with a 10%-point higher tax rate in neighboring 
countries implies an 8% higher rate in a particular European country (Mooij, 
2004). 
Its development is much facilitated by the occurrence, in the 
contemporary world, of the possibility of dissociating the advantages 
(infrastructure, education) and, respectively, the inconveniences (contribution to 
public cashing) which are presented by a tax jurisdiction or another, 
phenomenon known under the name of free riding. 
It is practically impossible to can be determined which of the presumed 
effects of tax competition are more susceptible to display, since this thing 
depends on a variety of factors, which specialty literature emphasized step by 
step:  
- availability of the alternative mechanisms which can substitute the taxes 
as an instrument of attracting the capital; 
- asymmetries among the countries from the point of view of dimensions 
and endowment with resources; 
- condensing the production in certain geographic spaces 
(“agglomeration” within the  “center-outskirts” models); 
- existence of scale economies in delivering public assets and services; 
- offering by the public sector of some inputs which reduce the private 
production cost; 
- mobility level of production factors; 
- existence or not of the home bias; 
- possibility of cross-border compensation of tax losses, and so on. 
 
Tax competition – How does Romania React? 
 
Tax competition is a two blades gun, a boomerang which turns against the 
state, which tries to attract capital through reduced tax quotas of the profits. The 
investors who today applaud the obtained tax facilities, tomorrow they will run, 
since they won't have labor force trained at the standards imposed by the level of 
technological development. A symbolic taxation of business means less money to 
the public budget, so it means amounts which are not enough for qualitative 
education, for primary medical care, for rehabilitating and maintaining of a fund 
of human resources to European standards. 
Romania is not the most attractive country, fiscally speaking. While in our 
country double taxation makes unattractive the stock market, the Czech Republic 
and Bulgaria introduce more friendly flat taxes (15% in Czech Republic and 10% 
in Bulgaria). But, Romania can become the economic center of Balkans.  
The reality is rougher. We take the 12th place from 19 places2 in the area 
regarding the taxes' share in the net revenue of a company (with 46,9 per cent - 
table 1) and this taking into consideration the main taxes and tax rates (on 
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revenue, on profit, on property, Health Insurance House) and not all the 278 para-
fiscal taxes which disturb the free initiative in Romania. 
Meanwhile, the wind of change breezes near us. In 2007 and 2008, five 
countries from the area (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic) have introduced flat taxes smaller than quota of 16% from Romania. 
In Romania, the flat tax is seen as a panacea, either as an universal evil. 
For the followers of the flat tax, who want to tax with 16% everything related to 
economy, it solves all the problems, despite double taxation which brings in its 
Romanian shape. For its competitors, it is the cause of inflation and of 
introduction of new taxes, even though the budgetary revenues are rising. 
In a debate organized by the “Wall Street Journal“, the president of the 
Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus (the architect of the tax reform from 2008) drew 
the attention that proportional taxation can not be a solution to all the problems 
which an economy confronts with. Also, the laureate of the Nobel Prize for 
economy, Gary Becker, warned that “a flat tax is not so flat“, referring to the 
double taxation and to the taxation of special groups of interest. “Which is 
desirable is a low rate of taxation, doesn't have to be flat” was the conclusion of 
the American economist. 
Which shakes the tax competitiveness of Romania in the area is above the 
high share of social contributions, the radical form of applying the flat tax. There 
aren't taxed only the regular incomes with 16 per cent, but also the savings and 
investments. 
The extension of the flat tax principle to all the income forms puts us on 
the second place in the area regarding the tax on equities. Ahead of us there is 
only Poland, with 19 per cent. Neither to the tax on capital revenues we are not 
much better, since we are somewhere in the average of the area. But in Estonia, 
after introducing the flat tax, it was eliminated the double taxation of profit and 
equities. Taxing the equities is also absent in Croatia and Hungary. Noticing that 
it loses ground regarding the tax competitiveness (115th place in the world, with a 
share of taxes of 48,6 per cent from the commercial revenue of companies), in 
exchange, the Czech Republic introduced starting from the 1st of January 2008 a 
proportional taxation system. Regarding the tax on income of natural persons, the 
ex-system with four rates (12, 19, 25 and 32 per cent) was replaced with a flat tax 
of 15 per cent, which would be followed by a new discount of 12,5 per cent in 
2009. In exchange, the social and health contributions were included in the tax 
basis of the tax on income. 
According to the calculations of the American expert Alvin Rabushka, the 
author of the most important treaties about the flat tax, including the contributions 
in the tax basis makes that in reality the flat tax applied to the income in 2009 to 
be of  19,4 per cent and not of only 12,5 per cent. Another component of the tax 
reform from Prague aims the tax on profit of the companies: this was reduced 
from 24 to 21 per cent in 2008, going to be dropped at 19 per cent in 2009. 
Which, in practice, means only that in 2009, the Czech Republic (through 19,4 per 
cent tax on income and 19 per cent tax on profit) will be equal to Slovakia, where 
is a flat tax of the personal incomes and that of companies of 19 per cent. 
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Meanwhile, in Romania there are several forms of double taxation: on 
profit and equities, on income and on the trading of capital assets, and so on. 
But in the current European context, Romania needs a simple and 
competitive tax vision, which would attract the investors and bring forth a 
transparent and easy to manage business environment, in parallel with bringing to 
light the underground economy and severe fighting of tax evasion. Still, the 
highest risk is that tax legislation to be held by certain groups of interest, opposing 
to the main principle of defending the competition and not the competitors. 
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Total Tax Rate – in Eastern Europe 
Table 1 
 
Country 
Total Taxe Rate 
- TTR (% of 
comercial 
profits) 
Corporate 
income 
tax TTR 
Labour 
tax 
TTR 
Other 
taxes 
TTR 
TTR 
Rank 
Albania 46,8 17,7 24,5 4,6 105 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 44,1 21,5 17,2 5,4 90 
Bulgaria 36,7 6,6 26,6 3,5 59 
Croatia 32,5 11,4 19,4 1,7 34 
Czech Republic 48,6 5,9 39,5 3,2 115 
Estonia 49,2 9,3 38,3 1,6 118 
Georgia 38,6 14,1 22,6 2 70 
Latvia 32,6 2,2 27,2 3,3 37 
Lithuania 48,3 8,3 35,2 4,9 112 
Macedonia FYR 49,8 13,1 33,2 3,5 119 
Moldova 44 10,5 31,6 1,9 89 
Montenegro 31,6 9,3 20 2,3 30 
Poland 38,8 12,7 23,6 2,1 67 
Romania 46,9 10,4 34,4 2,1 107 
Russia 51,4 14 31,8 5,7 131 
Serbia 35,8 11,7 20,2 3,9 53 
Slovakia 50,5 9 39,7 1,8 121 
Slovenia 39,2 14,3 22 2,9 74 
Ukraine 57,3 12,2 43,4 1,8 145 
   Source: Paying Taxes 2008 – The global pictures, The World Bank and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey, 2008 
 
